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Abstract 
 
We analyse the determinants of overeducation among school leavers within a search 
theoretical framework. Overeducation is measured on the basis of job analysis (JA), the 
required level to get the job (RL) and realised matches (RM). It is shown that the choice of 
the measure is crucial for the outcome of the analysis. Job levels measured by RL and RM are 
clearly biased. Hence, only a few results are robust: higher qualified individuals occupy 
higher complexity jobs and overeducation is less prevalent among school leavers with better 
study results and in small organizations. Conversely, JA generally delivers results that are 
consistent with theoretical considerations. Based on JA, overeducation is also lower among 
men, whites, school leavers with higher educated parents, search intensive individuals and 
school leavers from higher quality institutions. Furthermore, overeducated workers are more 
often hired in occupations without structural bottleneck vacancies and in the financial and 
professional services sector. Additionally, irrespective of the used measure, heterogeneous 
requirements within complexity levels explain a significant but small part of the extent of 
overeducation. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The importance of education is now generally recognised, not only for social cohesion but 
also as a crucial determinant of sustained economic growth (see e.g. Storesletten and Zilibotti 
(2000)). Investments in education have risen in most industrialised countries. As a result, 
educational levels of the population in general and school leavers in particular are now much 
higher than a few decades ago. Parallel to this evolution, there have been growing concerns 
about overeducation. Today an extensive literature on overeducation exists. Estimates for 
different countries range from 10% to more than 40% (Groot and Maassen van den Brink 
(2000)). Although most of the literature focuses on the relationship between overeducation 
and earnings, a lot of articles also pay attention to the determinants of overeducation1. While 
different measures for overeducation are used in the literature, only McGoldrick and Robst 
(1996) and Giret and Hatot (2001) have estimated the determinants of overeducation based on 
more than one measure. Their results for some of the explanatory variables are clearly 
different over the applied measures. This suggests that the outcome of the analysis of the 
determinants of overeducation often tells more about the applied measurement than about the 
real factors determining overeducation2. 
Relying on three different measures, we analyse the determinants of overeducation in 
the first job after leaving school within a search theoretical framework. Through a deeper 
examination of the outcomes and measures, we try to shed more light on the validity of the 
measures and to identify the real factors that determine overeducation. The analysis is based 
on the Flemish SONAR-database, resulting from a survey of 3015 23 year olds about their 
educational and labour market career. These data give us the opportunity to analyse 
overeducation on the basis of (1) job analysis, (2) the required educational level to get the job 
and (3) realised matches. The article is structured as follows. In section II we deal with our 
theoretical framework and formulate some hypotheses. The measurement of overeducation is 
discussed in section III. Section IV presents the data. The empirical model is described in 
section V. The results of the empirical analysis are outlined in sections VI, VII and VIII. 
Finally, in section IX, we draw some conclusions. 
                                                          
1 The following authors pay at least part of their attention to the determinants of overeducation: Alba-Ramírez 
(1993), Robst (1995), McGoldrick and Robst (1996), Groot (1996), van der Meer and Wielers (1996), Sloane et 
al. (1996, 1999), Battu et al. (1999), Battu and Sloane (2000, 2002), Dolton and Silles (2001), Büchel and 
Pollmann-Schult (2001), Lassibille et al. (2001), Giret and Hatot (2001) and Chevalier (2003). 
2 Related to this problem is the influence of the measurement when analysing the impact of overeducation (see 
Verhaest and Omey (2004)).  
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II. Theoretical framework and hypotheses to be tested 
 
An individual can be defined as being overeducated if his educational level exceeds the 
minimal required education to do his/her job (i.e. its complexity level). However, there are 
some conceptual problems with this definition. Firstly, in a pure human capital framework, 
the concept of overeducation may be meaningless (Green et al. (1999), Sloane (2003)). 
According to human capital theory, markets are fully efficient. As a consequence, there 
should be no overinvestments in schooling. However, search frictions and information 
externalities may lead at least to a temporary mismatch. Furthermore, institutional rigidities 
make labour markets quite rigid. Secondly, formal education is an incomplete measure of 
total human capital. Overeducation may compensate for lower quality of education, for 
example due to differences in quality of institutions or study results. Overeducation can also 
be permanent if it compensates for lower ability or a depreciation of skills. Undereducation 
may simply follow from additional experience or on-the-job training. Thus, a clear distinction 
has to be made between educational and skill mismatches (see e.g. Allen and van der Velden 
(2001)). In this paper we always use the concept of overeducation in the meaning of 
educational mismatches: when the formal educational level exceeds the complexity level. 
Thirdly, this definition starts from a discrete production function for each type of jobs with 
some threshold educational level that is necessary to be productive. Following Knight’s 
(1979) specification of occupational productions functions, it would be more general to 
assume a continuous function with (initially increasing and then) decreasing marginal returns 
to schooling (cf. figure). Thus it makes more sense to define the complexity level by the 
optimal educational level: given an indifference curve I that reflects the educational costs (cf. 
Mincer (1974)), jobs of type k and production function kY  have complexity level ∗kc . 
This definition and productivity pattern is compatible with an approach of skill 
mismatches as over- or underinvestments in skills. It is intuitive that, compared to a secondary 
education school leaver, a university graduate is much more productive in a management 
function, but only slightly more productive in a lower clerical position. It is also in line with 
the stylised fact of the literature on overeducation and earnings that the return to 
overeducation is positive but smaller than the return to required education (cf. Hartog (2000)). 
However, it remains puzzling why the penalty for undereducation is generally lower than the 
return to required education and often not significantly different from zero. A plausible 
explanation is that undereducation not reflects a mismatch of skills (cf. supra). An employer 
will only offer a job to an undereducated school leaver if (1) the job seeker possesses enough 
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additional skills that compensate for the lack of formal education skills or (2) he is not able to 
find a higher educated job seeker for a vacant position. In this last case, there will be a strong 
incentive to compensate the underinvestment in formal education skills by additional formal 
or informal training3. Nevertheless, it is remains unclear how the optimal educational level 
can be derived for each complexity type of jobs. We cannot simply observe this complexity 
level from reality in the case of rigid and inefficient working markets. Additionally, the 
optimal level will differ from a private or social point of view. As will be shown in sections 
III and V, the problem of translating each complexity type k into an optimal level can be 
bypassed when analysing the determinants of overeducation.  
 
I
1Y
2Y
3Y
4Y
5Y  
∗
5c∗4c∗3c∗2c
Y 
∗
1c Educational level 
 
Essentially, what we are interested in is what determines whether a school leaver gets and 
accepts an offer for a job of type k and complexity level ∗kc . Search theory delivers an 
attractive way to model this decision process. It starts from the assumption that job seekers 
have a minimal acceptable wage offer, the reservation wage. This framework can be easily 
translated to a model in which individuals not search for a minimal acceptable wage, but a 
minimal acceptable complexity level, the reservation level. Since wages are positively related 
to the complexity level, this is compatible with wage maximizing behaviour (Hartog (2000)). 
Following Mortensen (1986), the reservation complexity level can be written as:  
 
(1.1) ( )111121111r rswfc ,,,,,, τσµλ=  
 
The reservation level rc  is a positive function of the rate of job offers 1λ , the mean of the 
complexity offer distribution 1µ , its variance 21σ , the opportunity cost of work 1w , the time 
                                                          
3 In line with this, Beneito et al. (2002) found that training compensates part of the penalty for undereducation.  
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left until the liquidity constraint becomes binding 1τ  and a negative function of the cost of 
search 1s  and the interest rate 1r . A higher reservation level corresponds to a higher 
probability of occupying a more complex job and, controlling for the educational level, a 
lower probability of being overeducated. Differences in the offer arrival rate and mean offered 
level will in the first place result from differences in human capital. In the case of imperfect 
information about the workers’ productivity, also signalling arguments will play a role. 
Finally, differences in these parameters may also result from subjective elements such as taste 
discrimination.  
Based on this search framework, we formulate some hypotheses that will be tested in 
the empirical analysis:  
(H1) Higher qualified individuals occupy higher complexity jobs. Their higher productivity 
will lead to a higher offer arrival rate and higher mean level of the offered jobs. Education 
may also function as a signal for ability (Arrow (1972), Spence (1972)) or trainability 
(Thurow (1975)), what leads to a similar expectation.  
(H2) School leavers with better study results and (H3) from higher quality institutions have a 
lower probability of being overeducated. School leavers with better study results may have a 
higher level of human capital and thus a higher offer arrival rate and mean offered level. 
Study results and certificates from higher quality institutions may also be used as a signal for 
ability or trainability by employers.  
(H4) Women and (H5) non-whites have a higher probability of being overeducated. Women 
have a higher probability of quitting or interrupting their job, what causes productivity losses. 
For young female job applicants, employers may especially fear interruptions for pregnancy 
or parental leave. According to statistical discrimination theories (Phelps (1972), Arrow 
(1973)), employers will use the sex of the job seeker as a signal for his/her future 
productivity. Taste discrimination (Becker (1975)) will have a similar effect. Anti-
discriminatory policy often prevents employers from paying lower wages and using different 
hiring standards. However, it is difficult to enforce equal effective employment opportunities 
(Renes and Ridder (1995)), especially if there are multiple applicants. Additionally, taste 
discrimination will not lead to loss of efficiency in this case (Thurow (1975))4. Similarly, taste 
discrimination will also lead to a lower offer arrival rate and a lower mean level of the offered 
                                                          
4 Two additional effects may play a role for married women. We do not take them under consideration since the 
number of married women and women with children is negligible at the start of the first job. Frank (1978) states 
that married women are more likely to be overeducated since their search is spatially constrained if the family 
residence is determined by the man. Otherwise, women with children may have a higher preference for 
homework activities (Gronau (1974)).  
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jobs among non-whites. 
(H6) Individuals with higher educated parents are less often overeducated. Although school 
leavers are inexperienced job seekers, they can partly avoid the costs of search by pooling 
information. We expect that individuals with highly educated parents and more social capital 
have more information on available jobs and thus a higher job arrival rate. Individuals with 
highly educated and wealthy parents also face less credit constraints. 
(H7) The probability of being overeducated is lower among search intensive individuals. A 
higher search intensity leads to a higher offer arrival rate.  
The previous search framework highlights overeducation from a supply side point of 
view. Similarly, we can also construct a search framework that determines whether an 
employer gets and hires a young job applicant with a particular educational level. While the 
school leaver is interested in the offered wage, the employer is rather interested in the 
productivity of the applicant. Supposing that expected productivity is positively related to the 
educational level of the worker (cf. figure), employers may a priori determine a reservation 
educational level re  below which they won’ t hire any school leaver: 
 
(1.2) ( )222222222r rswfe ,,,,,, τσµλ=  
 
With the rate at which job seekers apply for the job 2λ , the mean of the expected productivity 
offer distribution 2µ , its variance 22σ , costs associated with the match such as the wage 2w , a 
liquidity constraint variable 2τ , the cost of search 2s  and the interest rate 2r . A higher 
reservation educational level corresponds to a higher probability of hiring a higher educated 
school leaver and thus, controlling for the complexity level, a higher probability that the hired 
applicant is overeducated for the job.  
The following demand side hypotheses will be tested:  
(H8) Higher complexity jobs more often rely on higher qualified workers. The mean expected 
productivity of higher educated workers is positively related to the complexity of the job.  
(H9) The probability of hiring an overeducated worker is lower in occupations with structural 
bottleneck vacancies. Jobs require different tasks and worker productivity at those tasks is 
largely different (Sattinger (1993)). Hence, the likelihood of hiring an overeducated worker 
for a job will depend on the supply and demand conditions of the type of required skills. In 
the case of structural bottleneck vacancies, employers will have to downgrade their selection 
requirements, due to a lower application rate.  
(H10) The probability of hiring an overeducated worker is higher in large organizations. Van 
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der Meer and Wielers (1996) state that large organizations face more difficulties to measure 
the contribution of the individual worker and thus have a larger incentive to rely on 
educational credentials. There may also be other reasons why large firms more often hire 
overeducated workers. They may have lower vacancy costs due to economies of scale and 
face less liquidity constraints. Furthermore, they have more promotion opportunities. This not 
only results in a higher application rate, but also in a higher expected mean productivity since 
they face less productivity losses due to quits of overeducated workers.  
(H11) The probability of hiring an overeducated worker is higher in the financial and 
professional services sector. Since the quality of the product is hard to measure in these 
sectors, firms will have to build a trust relationship with their clients. Educational credentials 
of the workers will not only serve as an indicator for productivity, but also as a legitimation to 
their clients (van der Meer and Wielers (1996)).  
 
 
III. The measurement of overeducation 
 
Following the definition in the previous section, overeducation can be measured by a 
comparison of the educational level of the worker ∗e  and the complexity level of the job ∗c . 
There may be a large heterogeneity in skills of individuals with a similar educational 
background. Some authors (Green et al. (1999), Chevalier (2003)) indeed found that 
overeducated workers are less able in comparison with rightly educated workers with a 
similar schooling. By defining overeducation in terms of educational mismatches, we 
concentrate on the measurement of the complexity level. Although also observed educational 
levels may be subject to some measurement error, the measurement of ∗c  is much more 
problematic. Broadly speaking three ways of measuring the complexity level have been 
adopted in the literature. A first method measures ∗c  by job analysis (e.g. Rumberger (1987)) 
(JA). This is an objective approach based on the evaluation of required schooling by job 
experts, which classify the job in an occupational classification. Secondly, a more subjective 
approach is to ask respondents in a survey what minimal level of education is required to get 
(e.g. Duncan and Hoffman (1981)) or to do (e.g. Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988)) their job 
(RL). A last method derives ∗c  from realised matches (RM). Required education is measured 
by the average (e.g. Verdugo and Verdugo (1988)) or mode (e.g. Kiker et al. (1997)) 
educational level in a certain occupation. Chevalier (2003) adopted an alternative approach by 
defining objectively overeducated who are not satisfied with their job as being genuinely 
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overeducated. Those classified as being overeducated but reporting to be satisfied with their 
match were classified as being apparently overeducated.  
Each measure has its shortcomings and we distinguish three types of measurement 
error. For simplicity, suppose that ∗e  and ∗c  are continuous variables. Following our search 
theoretical framework, the complexity level ∗ic  of the accepted job of school leaver i depends 
on his educational level ∗ie  and other individual characteristic ix  (2.1). Similarly, the 
educational level ∗je  of the hired applicant for job j depends on complexity level ∗jc  and job 
characteristic jy  (2.2). Finally, suppose that ∗c  is related to its measure 
mc  following (2.3): 
 
(2.1) i1i1i11i uxbeazc +++=
∗∗  
(2.2) j2j2j22j uybcaze +++=
∗∗  
(2.3) mtt
m
2t
m
1
m
t
m
t uybxbzcc ++++=
∗  { }jit ,∈  
 
A first type of error mtu  is a simple random measurement error with zero mean and variance 
2
mσ . It is difficult to think of any economic or social indicator that is fully free of random 
error, due to the typical problems accompanied with data collection and processing. Thus, 
also the measurement of the job level will be subject to it. The classification of jobs by JA is 
not straightforward. Additionally, there may be a substantial heterogeneity of requirements 
within a similar job if the classification is based on more aggregate occupations (Halaby 
(1994)). Contrary, the worker can draw on detailed information of the characteristics of the 
job in his assessment of the required level to do his job. However, there is a lack of uniform 
coding instructions (Hartog (2000)). Some may report current hiring standards or their own 
skill or educational level (Chevalier (2003)), others the median educational level of identical 
workers in the firm. This is also the case if surveys ask to the required level to get the job. 
Additionally, the formal vacancy requirement often differs from the real required level for 
recruitment. Since the RM measure is also based on an occupational classification, the 
problems are similar to the JA measure. However, the heterogeneity of jobs within 
occupations will be much more problematic since a certain level of aggregation is necessary 
to keep enough observations within each occupation.  
The second type of error mz  leads to a systematic over- or underestimation of the 
complexity level for every observation. Also for job experts it remains difficult to translate 
each complexity type of jobs into an optimal educational level. Furthermore, it is often 
claimed that skill-biased technological change leads to a general upgrading of skill 
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requirements and thus to systematic underestimation of the complexity level measured by JA. 
Hence, the complexity level has to be redefined from time to time. Contrary, it is generally 
argued that measures based on RL systematically overestimate complexity levels. Employers 
will upgrade hiring standards in response to rising educational attainment of job applicants. 
Falling private educational costs over time, due to government subsidisation, lead to a rise in 
the private optimal level, without changing the social optimal level. Additionally, individuals 
tend to inflate the status of their own position (Hartog (2000)). The mean educational level 
may be a good estimate of the private optimal level only if labour markets are flexible and 
efficient. Otherwise, RM will systematically over- or underestimate the complexity level.  
The third type of errors m1b  and 
m
2b  also lead to a systematic bias of the job level, but 
only conditional on the value of respectively x and y. Technological change may occur at a 
different rate for alternative types of jobs and make some of them even more simple. Hence, 
the bias of the complexity level will also be related to the characteristics of the job. Workers’ 
assessment of the required level (RL) will be biased by the selection and screening behaviour 
of employers. Hence, apart from the second type error, complexity levels will be upwardly 
biased for jobs that rely more on educational credentials (cf. supra). The bias will not only be 
related to the characteristics of the job, but also to those of the worker. Individuals may tend 
to evaluate general educational requirements towards their own educational level. 
Furthermore, workers may report personal requirements instead of general requirement. 
Finally, social desirability bias may be higher for individuals with a relatively worse labour 
market position. It follows from these three arguments that groups of workers with a higher 
probability of being overeducated may overstate more often the complexity level of their job. 
Also the bias of the RM measure will be related to differences in hiring standards since it 
influences the average or mode educational level within occupations. 
To what extent do these different types of measurement error influence the analysis of 
the determinants of overeducation? From (2.1) - (2.3) it follows that: 
 
(2.4) ( ) ( ) ( )mii1im2im11i1m1mi uuybxbbeazzc +++++++= ∗  
(2.5) ( ) ( ) ( )mj2j2jm12jm222mj2m22j uauxbaybabcazaze −+−−++−=∗  
 
The first type of measurement error only influences the results in equation (2.5). This will 
bias the coefficients of the complexity level downward and usually also lead to some bias in 
the coefficients of the other explanatory variables (Verbeek (2000)). The second measurement 
error type does not cause serious problems since we are mainly interested in the value of 
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parameters 1b  and 2b . The main implication of the first two measurement types is to 
influence the incidence of over- and undereducation. A systematic and general overestimation 
of the complexity level ( 0>ma ) will lead to an overestimation of the incidence of 
overeducation and an underestimation of the incidence of undereducation. The opposite effect 
will occur in the case of systematic underestimation ( 0<ma ). Additionally, it is often 
suggested that the heterogeneity of educational requirements within an identical measured job 
level ( 02 >mσ ) leads to an overestimation of the incidence of over- as well as undereducation. 
This will indeed be the case if over- and undereducation can be regarded as exceptional 
situations. However, it may just as well lead to an underestimation of the incidence of 
overeducation if overeducation is rather the rule. Thus, the only thing we can say for sure in 
the case of random error is that part of the variation in the extent of overeducation may be 
explained by a heterogeneity of requirements within each measured complexity level. Jobs 
with relatively more of these unobserved requirements may then have a higher probability of 
being occupied by overeducated workers. We test the following hypothesis:  
(H12) Part of the variation in the extent of overeducation results from a heterogeneity of 
requirements within measured complexity levels.  
The third type of measurement error causes more problems since the bias is related to 
the variables of interest. This problem will be avoided for JA if the classification scheme is 
regularly updated. As Hartog (2000) states, there is no reason to expect bias in any particular 
direction in this case. It has the conceptual advantage to start from the technology of the job. 
And even if there is no regular update, the problem may be minimized if the classification is 
flexible and detailed enough. In this case, job experts have the possibility to classify jobs 
within similar occupations at various complexity types. The bias by the selection and 
screening behaviour of the employer of the job level based on RL is much more problematic. 
The true minimal required level to get a job corresponds to the definition of the reservation 
educational level. Relatively higher objective overeducation among particular jobs will then 
not show up in the data. Additionally, social desirability will bias downwardly the coefficients 
for the individual characteristics. Similarly for RM, a concentration of undereducation within 
a certain occupation, e.g. as a consequence of structural bottlenecks, will lead to a lower 
measured job level and hence, relatively less measured undereducation for that occupation. 
The following hypotheses regarding the measurement of overeducation will be tested: 
(H13) JA delivers the most consistent results for the analysis of the determinants of 
overeducation. 
(H14) The complexity level based on RL is biased by the selection behaviour of the employer. 
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(H15) The complexity level based on RM is biased by the extent of over- and undereducation 
within occupations. 
 
 
IV. Data and the incidence of overeducation  
 
The empirical analysis is based on the first cohort of the SONAR-database about the 
transition from school to work in Flanders. At the end of 1999, 3015 randomly chosen 
Flemish 23 years old were questioned about their educational and early labour market career5. 
We focus on the first job after leaving school, for which we have information on over- and 
undereducation6. Estimating our relations with a sample of school leavers is highly selective. 
However, one should interpret our observations as coming from a sample of entry jobs, a 
particular segment in the labour market where mismatch problems are most likely to occur. 
Additionally, concentrating on the first job has the conceptual advantage that educational 
mismatches to a large extent correspond to skill mismatches since school leavers do not yet 
have any on-the-job training or experience (cf. supra). A group of 15.2% still studied at the 
age of 23, while another 3.9% never had a job. Those with a job entered the labour market 
over the period 1994-1999. Furthermore, we restrict the analysis to the non-self employed 
with a job in Flanders (Brussels including). This reduces our sample to maximally 2199 
respondents.  
The questionnaire was based on a detailed calendar what avoids inconsistencies in the 
educational and work career. This minimizes measurement error in the educational level. 
While most studies only compute a single measure of mismatch, we assess over- and 
undereducation relying on job analysis (JA), the required level to get the job (RL) and realised 
matches (RM). The JA measure is derived from the 1992 Standard Occupation Classification 
of the Dutch CBS (1992). This is a detailed classification, based on a five-digit code and five 
complexity types: elementary, lower, medium, higher and scientific. The corresponding 
complexity levels are: less than lower secondary (<LS), lower secondary (LS), higher 
secondary (HS), lower tertiary (LT) and higher tertiary education (HT). To ensure 
comparability, we also use this educational classification for the computation of the measures 
based on RM and RL. The RL measure is based on the question: ‘To get your job, what 
educational level were you required to have?’. This question was posed to those who 
                                                          
5 For an extensive description of the data, we refer to SONAR (2000). 
6 The first job is defined to be the first job of at least one hour a week and a tenure of at least one month. 
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confirmed that a qualification was required for their job. Also the RM measure is computed 
from the CBS classification. Since most of occupations at the most detailed level have 
extremely low frequencies of observations, they are aggregated at the two-digit level. As in 
Kiker et al. (1997), the complexity level is defined as the modal educational level within the 
occupation. 
Some summary statistics regarding the computation of over- and undereducation can 
be found in table 1. A majority of the school leavers has a higher secondary degree. Based on 
JA, employment is relatively equally spread over the several job levels. As expected, the 
proportion that works at the two highest job levels is larger if the measure is based on RL. On 
the other hand, in more than 40% of the cases less than a lower secondary qualification was 
required to get the first job, while a lower secondary degree was minimally required for only 
4% of the school leavers. This particular bias may result from the assumption of employers 
that almost every job seeker has at least a lower secondary qualification with compulsory 
education until 18 in Flanders. When measured by RM, nobody occupies a job at the two 
lowest levels. This cohort effect results from the small size of the group of school leavers that 
enter the labour market without a higher secondary degree. Consequently, none of the two-
digit level occupations in the SONAR-database is occupied by a majority of lower educated. 
The incidence of overeducation (OVER) varies between only 12.7% based on RM, 44.5% 
based on RL and almost 55% based on JA. When measured by RM, the overeducation figure 
is remarkably small, while the incidence of undereducation is rather large (13,2%). This is 
consistent with a systematic overestimation of the complexity level. Based on JA, we find a 
relatively small incidence of undereducation. In section II, we indeed motivated that it is only 
beneficial to hire an undereducated school leaver under rather exceptional conditions. Finally, 
the very small incidence of undereducation based on RL is in line with the supposition that 
the RL level reflects the reservation educational level of the employer (cf. section III).  
 
Table 1: Some summary statistics 
Complexity level (C)  Educational level (E) 
JA RL RM 
(1) <LS 3.3% 16.8% 40.9% - 
(2) LS 5.9% 29.9% 4.0% - 
(3) HS 53.3% 28.0% 22.0% 62.9% 
(4) LT 27.3% 20.8% 24.3% 31.0% 
(5) HT 10.1% 4.5% 8.9% 5.0% 
OVER  54.3% 44.5% 12.7% 
UNDER  4.0% 2.6% 13.2% 
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V. Empirical model 
 
Since we measure the complexity level ∗tc  by the ordered response variable { }54321ct ,,,,∈  
and the educational level ∗te  by { }54321et ,,,,∈ , OLS is inappropriate. Based on an ordered 
logit model, we estimate the probability that a school leaver i with educational level lei =  
and a vector of n other individual characteristics )',...,,( nii2i1i XXXX =  finds a first job of 
complexity type k. This model can be specified as follows: 
 
(3.1) ( )( ) [ ]i1i1i1ki
i XE
kcP
kcP
εβαθ ++−=


>
≤log   { }4321k ,,,∈  
 
Where ),,,( 141312111 ααααα = , ),...,,( 112111 nββββ =  and )',,,( i4i3i2i1i EEEEE =  with all 
elements equal to zero, except liE = 1. Estimation (3.1) is completely equivalent to the 
estimation of the determinants of overeducation and the effect of the other characteristics iX  
on the probability of overeducation (and undereducation) can be derived for each educational 
level ie . A higher probability of finding a more complex job for an individual with a positive 
value of e.g. characteristic iX1  ( 011 >β ) is equivalent to a lower (higher) probability of being 
overeducated (undereducated). This approach is preferred to the often applied multinomial 
model with dummies for a good match, over- and undereducation since it is in line with our 
search theoretical framework. Furthermore, this model is not sensitive to any systematic over- 
or underestimation of the complexity level. Additionally, the problem of translating each 
complexity type of jobs into an optimal educational level is bypassed. We only have to 
assume that jobs of type k have a lower complexity level than jobs of type k+1. It makes JA, 
starting from the underlying technology of each job, even more attractive. Finally, we would 
have to exclude the observations for the lowest (highest) educational level since, by 
definition, they cannot be overeducated (undereducated). Due to a zero cell count, we exclude 
those with less than a lower secondary degree ( ie = 1) from the analysis based on RM.  
The educational level dummies lE  enable us to test (H1). In interaction with a tertiary 
education qualification ( { }54ei ,∈ ), we include two dummies for the study results in the last 
year (H2). For other educational levels, we have no observations on study results. We also 
control for the quality of the institution (H3), by including in interaction with a higher tertiary 
degree ( ie = 5) a dummy for those who obtained their degree at university. University 
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education in Flanders is generally perceived as being of a higher quality than non-university 
higher tertiary education. Furthermore, we control for gender (H4), race (H5) and the 
education of the parents by including a dummy for a father with a higher tertiary education 
(H6). To test for the hypothesis that search intensive individuals have a lower probability of 
being overeducated (H7), we include two dummies for school leavers who started their search 
activity respectively within and more than one month before leaving school. The assumption 
that search intensive and thus motivated individuals also start their search activity earlier 
seems reasonable. Since the group of school leavers with a higher secondary degree ( ie = 3) is 
very heterogeneous, we include extra dummies for those who (1) obtained their degree in 
part-time education, (2) obtained an extra part-time education, (3) qualified for an extra 
seventh year and (4) passed at least one year in tertiary education, without obtaining the final 
degree. As (H1) predicts, these extra qualifications may raise the likelihood of obtaining a 
higher complexity job, while a part-time education may lower this likelihood. Finally, we also 
include educational subject and regional residence dummies to control for differences in 
preferences and underlying demand and supply conditions. 
Similarly, we estimate the probability that for a vacant entry job j with complexity 
level kc j =  and a vector of m other job characteristics )',...,( , mjj2j1j YYYY =  a school leaver 
with educational level l is hired: 
 
(3.2) 
( )
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Where )',,,( j4j3j2j1j CCCCC =  with all elements equal to zero, except kjC = 1. In this model, 
a higher probability of hiring a better educated school leaver for a job with e.g. characteristic 
jY1  ( 021 >β ) corresponds to a higher (lower) probability of recruiting an overeducated 
(undereducated) worker. Along with complexity level dummies, that also test for (H8), we 
include dummies for firm size (H10) and sector of employment (H11). To test the hypothesis 
that the likelihood of hiring overqualified workers is lower in structural bottleneck vacancy 
jobs (H9), we include dummies for technical, clerical and socio-cultural professions. 
According to the Flemish regional employment agency VDAB (2000), during the nineties, 
bottleneck vacancies were especially concentrated in technical professions. The opposite 
holds for socio-cultural professions, which had no problems to fill their vacancies. No clear 
prediction can be made for clerical professions, a heterogeneous group. While there was a 
permanent shortage of information scientists, there were far less vacancy problems for lower 
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administrative jobs. Finally, we also include dummies for part-time contract, temporary 
contract and the region of employment as additional control variables.  
The first type of measurement error may not only bias the coefficients of the 
complexity levels downward, but will usually also lead to some bias in the coefficients of the 
other explanatory variables (cf. supra). To control for the heterogeneous requirements of jobs 
with an identical measured job level, we construct a job complexity variable based on factor 
analysis. This factor is constructed from five job skills that are needed to do the job: 
responsibility, leadership, reading and writing, mathematical and social skills. These skills are 
general in nature and can be used in almost every type of job or occupation, but make them 
more complex. The residuals of the regression of this factor on the corresponding complexity 
levels are included as a determinant in equation (3.2) and may account at least for the random 
part of the unmeasured heterogeneity of skill requirements. Since individuals may take their 
colleagues as a reference when answering in surveys on scale questions about requirements of 
particular skills, it may be less effective to account for measurement errors that are related to 
the characteristics of the job. The results and statistics of the factor and regression analysis are 
reported in Appendix B. We expect that jobs with more of these unmeasured skill 
requirements have a higher probability of being occupied by overeducated workers7. This test 
can be seen as a test for the opposite side of the story told by Chevalier (2003). He controlled 
for the heterogeneity in the skills of graduates by including a proxy for unobservable skills 
and showed that part of the variation in measured overeducation is explained by these 
unobserved skills. We test for the hypothesis that part of the variation in measured 
overeducation is explained by this unmeasured complexity (H12).  
The hypothesis that the job analysis measure delivers the most consistent results (H13) 
is tested by evaluating to what extent hypotheses (H1) to (H11) are confirmed for the analyses 
based on the various measures. Supposing that JA delivers an unbiased measure for the 
complexity level and that the RL level measures the reservation educational level 
{ }54321erj ,,,,∈ , we have a measure for qualification inflation by comparing this job level 
with the RL level8. A job is characterized by qualification inflation (deflation) if the 
reservation educational level is higher (lower) than the complexity level. The determinants of 
qualification inflation can be analysed by estimating the probability that for an entry job j 
                                                          
7 One way to control for all unobserved heterogeneity is the application of a panel data analysis. However, this 
requires that jobs remain unchanged over time, what is not realistic.  
8 Green et al. (1999) and Dolton and Silles (2001) used a similar indicator for qualification inflation and 
deflation, but the functional level was measured by the self-assessed required level to do the job. 
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with complexity level kc j =  and a vector of other characteristics jY  minimally qualification 
r is required to get the job:  
 
(3.3) 
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Where )',,,( j4j3j2j1j CCCCC =  with all elements equal to zero, except kjC = 1. A higher 
probability that a better qualification is required to get a job with e.g. characteristic jY1  
( 031 >β ) corresponds to a higher (lower) probability of qualification inflation (deflation). If 
the reported required level to get the job indeed corresponds to the reservation educational 
level, the results for qualification inflation have to be identical to those for overeducation. 
Thus, we expect that qualification inflation is lower in jobs with structural bottleneck 
vacancies (H9) and higher in large firms (H10) and the financial and professional services 
sector (H11). Similarly, the reservation educational level has to be higher for higher 
complexity jobs (H8). This estimation also delivers a test for the hypothesis that the level 
measured by RL is biased by the selection behaviour of the employer (H14). If this measure is 
unbiased, we expect that there is no correlation with the other characteristics ( 03 =β ). 
We could apply the same test procedure for (H15) by using the modal educational 
level within occupations as dependent variable. However, due to zero cell counts, we have to 
apply a binary logit model and restrict the analysis to two complexity levels (HS and LT). We 
estimate the probability that for an entry job j the RM level { }543mj ,,∈  exceeds the 
complexity level { }43c j ,∈ :  
 
(3.4)  
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Contrary to equation (3.3), this equation has no economic interpretation. If the RM measure is 
not affected by the last type of measurement error, then the other characteristics jy  should be 
unrelated to this probability ( 04 =β ). In line with (H15), we expect that this probability is 
higher in technical professions and lower in socio-cultural professions. Of course, the validity 
of these test procedures depend on the proposition that our JA measure is an unbiased 
measure for the complexity level.  
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VI. The determinants of being overeducated 
 
The results of estimation (3.1) are given in table 2. We discuss systematically the various 
hypotheses formulated in section II regarding the determinants of being overeducated.  
(H1) Higher qualified individuals occupy higher complexity jobs. This hypothesis 
cannot properly be evaluated based on the estimation results in table 2 since some interaction 
terms with the educational levels were included in the model. We computed the estimated 
cumulative probabilities for the different educational levels, based on sample mean 
characteristics (cf. Appendix C). The hypothesis is confirmed by these results: a higher 
educational level increases the likelihood of getting a higher complexity job, independently of 
the way the job level is measured9. However, there are only small differences between the two 
lowest levels. This suggest that the market does not distinguish much between individuals 
who have no higher secondary qualification. An additional part-time qualification, a seventh 
year degree or at least one completed year of tertiary education for school leavers with a 
higher secondary degree also increases the likelihood of occupying a higher complexity job as 
measured by JA (cf. table 2). With the exception of an extra part-time qualification, this is 
also the case when the job level is defined by RL. No significant effects are found with 
respect to the RM measure, but a part-time higher secondary qualification, compared to a full-
time qualification, leads in this case to a lower likelihood of getting a higher complexity job.  
(H2) School leavers with better study results have a lower probability of being 
overeducated. School leavers with a great distinction degree in the last year of tertiary 
education have a significant higher probability of obtaining a higher complexity job, 
irrespective of the measurement of the job level. The relation between study results and 
overeducation was also examined by Battu et al. (1999) and Dolton and Silles (2001) for 
British graduate school leavers. The results of Dolton and Silles indicated also that individuals 
with a first class degree have a lower probability of being overeducated in the first job after 
leaving school. Battu et al. found a similar negative relation between high study results and 
the likelihood of being overeducated one year after graduation, but not for all cohorts. Büchel 
and Pollmann-Schult (2001) found an effect from higher grades on the likelihood of being 
overeducated even at the age of 27 to 34 for some groups of German workers with certain 
vocational qualifications. 
                                                          
9 It may be expected that this result partly follows from the fact that lower and higher educated workers entered 
the labour market at a different phase in the business cycle. However, the inclusion of year dummies didn’t lead 
to any significant improvement of the model.  
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(H3) School leavers from higher quality institutions have a lower probability of being 
overeducated. Having a higher tertiary qualification from university instead of a degree from 
a non-university institution substantially increases the probability of getting a job with a 
higher complexity level, but the relation is not significant when this level is defined as the 
required level to get the job. The relation between school quality and overeducation is 
confirmed by the research of Robst (1995) which is based on more refined quality measures.  
(H4) Women have a higher probability of being overeducated. Controlling for the 
educational level, women have a significant lower probability of occupying a higher 
complexity job based on JA. This implies a higher probability of being overeducated. 
However, this hypothesis is not confirmed in the estimations for the other measures. Also 
Dolton and Silles (2001) and Giret and Hatot (2001) didn’t find a significant effect based on a 
self assessment measure for respectively British and French female school leavers. 
Furthermore, like Lassibille et al. (2001) for Spanish school leavers, Giret and Hatot (2001) 
also found a higher probability of being overeducated for the first job based on JA. 
Alternatively, Chevalier (2003) didn’t find any significant effect. However, comparisons with 
this study are complicated by the alternative definition of overeducation (cf. supra)10. Also 
comparisons with other research are difficult since the relation between gender and 
overeducation is theoretically less clear for the whole labour force. Furthermore, most of the 
studies do not control for educational subjects, while educational and occupational 
segregation largely influences differences in over- and undereducation among men and 
women. 
(H5) Non-whites have a higher probability of being overeducated.  Also non-whites 
have a significant lower probability of occupying a higher complexity level job based on JA. 
Again, the effect is insignificant for the measure based on RL and positive but not significant 
at the 5% level for the RM measure. Battu and Sloane (2002) examined the relation between 
ethnic background and overeducation in more detail and found that the incidence of 
overeducation is lower among whites, but varies substantially among ethnic minorities in 
Britain. 
(H6) Individuals with higher educated parents are less often overeducated. School 
leavers with a father who has a higher tertiary qualification indeed have a lower probability of 
being overeducated. However, the relation is not significant when the job level is measured by 
RL. Again, Giret and Hatot (2001) found similar results: a significant lower probability of 
being overeducated based on JA among school leavers with a higher educated father, but an 
                                                          
10 Additionally, the objective definition of overeducation is based on a very rudimentary classification using the 
2-digit Standard Occupation Code, what makes this measure much more sensitive to potential biases (cf. supra). 
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insignificant effect based on self assessment. Furthermore, the relation between the schooling 
of the father and overeducation based on self-assessment was also insignificant in the research 
of Büchel and Pollmann-Schult (2001). Lassibille et al. (2001) controlled for the father’s 
occupation and the mother’s employment status instead of the educational level of the parents, 
but didn’t find any effect.  
 
Table 2: The determinants of finding a job with complexity level k (equation (3.1)): Ordered 
logit coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) 
Job level measurement JA RL RM 
Threshold kθ          
(1) <LS  -5,291 ** (,393) -7,542 ** (,490) - 
(2) LS  -3,284 ** (,387) -7,289 ** (,489) - 
(3) HS  -,737 * (,375) -5,170 ** (,480) -2,569 ** (,453) 
(4) LT  2,631 ** (,388) -,874 * (,436) 2,082 ** (,430) 
         
Educational level iE          
(coefficient α1)         
(1) <LS -5,048 ** (,443) -9,287 ** (,602) - 
(2) LS -4,942 ** (,415) -9,177 ** (,543) -6,520 ** (,734) 
(3) HS -4,359 ** (,394) -8,042 ** (,492) -5,777 ** (,510) 
(4) LT -1,377 ** (,408) -4,189 ** (,507) -2,520 ** (,472) 
(5) HT (ref.)         
         
Background         
Woman -,239 ** (,088) -,125  (,101) ,226  (,136) 
Non-white -,393 * (,194) -,175  (,240) ,647  (,353) 
HT father ,316 * (,146) ,245  (,168) ,447 * (,184) 
         
Search behaviour         
< 1 month before ,345 ** (,106) ,227  (,120) ,279  (,162) 
> 1 month before ,403 ** (,124) ,291 * (,141) ,171  (,170) 
         
Study results*TE         
Great distinction 1,071 ** (,268) ,947 ** (,348) ,992 ** (,300) 
Distinction ,216  (,153) ,128  (,174) ,186  (,176) 
         
Qualifications*HS         
Part-time -,173  (,195) -,073  (,225) -2,071 * (1,03) 
Extra Part-time ,644 * (,282) ,452  (,301) ,027  (,466) 
Seventh year ,461 ** (,140) ,564 ** (,151) ,082  (,276) 
Not finished TE ,604 ** (,205) ,611 ** (,213) ,407  (,293) 
         
Qualifications*HT         
University 1,364 ** (,316) ,555  (,384) 1,174 ** (,339) 
         
Chi² 1722,2** 2154,5** 1634,7** 
-2 Log Likelihood 2959,6 2475,3 1279.2 
Deg. of freedom 29 29 28 
N 2152 2095 2080 
Also included but not reported: educational subject*HS (3 dummies); educational subject*LT (5 dummies); 
educational subject*HT (2 dummies); regional residence (4 dummies). TE = tertiary education (LT or HT).  
*: significant at the 5% level, **: significant at the 1% level.  
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(H7) The likelihood of being overeducated is lower among search intensive individuals. This 
hypothesis is clearly confirmed with respect to the JA and RL measure. School leavers who 
start their search activity more than one month before the end of their school career have a 
significant higher probability of obtaining a higher complexity job. However, no significant 
relation is found based on RM.  
 
 
VII. The determinants of hiring an overeducated worker 
 
Table 3 reports the results with respect to equation (3.2). We considered the following 
hypotheses regarding the determinants of hiring an overeducated school leaver:  
(H8) Higher complexity jobs more often rely on higher qualified workers. Compared 
to (H1), this hypothesis can be seen as the opposite side of the same coin. Independently of 
the way the complexity levels are measured, higher complexity jobs more often rely on higher 
qualified workers. Also here, we computed the estimated cumulative percentages for the 
different levels (cf. Appendix C). The difference is almost negligible between the two lowest 
complexity levels measured by RL. This suggest that there is little difference in complexity 
between the two lowest job levels when measured by this measure. In more than 80% of the 
cases where no educational qualification was required, still a school leaver with a higher 
secondary qualification was recruited.  
(H9) The probability of hiring an overeducated worker is lower in occupations with 
structural bottleneck vacancies. Controlling for the complexity level, technical professions 
have only the lowest probability of being occupied by better educated workers in the 
regression based on JA. The opposite result can be expected for occupations without any 
problems with bottleneck vacancies. Socio-cultural occupations have indeed the highest 
probability of hiring better qualified workers. This conclusion holds for every measure. Other 
authors as well, such as Battu et al. (1999) and Dolton and Silles (2001), controlled for 
occupations, but they didn’t link their results to structural bottleneck vacancies. 
(H10) The probability of hiring an overeducated worker is higher in large 
organizations. The proposition of van der Meer and Wielers (1996) that large organizations 
rely more often on higher qualified workers is confirmed for all measures. However, this 
relationship is less strong when the complexity level is measured by RL. This hypothesis was 
also confirmed by the research of, among others, Battu et al. (1999), Dolton and Silles (2001) 
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and Giret and Hatot (2001). By contrast, Battu and Sloane (2002) didn’t find such a 
relationship, but their overeducation measure was based on the required level to get the job.  
 
Table 3: The determinants of hiring a school leaver with educational level l (equation (3.2): 
Ordered logit coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). 
Job level measurement JA RL RM 
Threshold lθ          
(1) <LS  -11,588 ** (,531) -12,926 ** (,483) -10,668 ** (,441) 
(2) LS  -10,386 ** (,521) -11,737 ** (,472) -9,496 ** (,429) 
(3) HS  -6,000 ** (,501) -7,097 ** (,450) -5,258 ** (,410) 
(4) LT  -2,598 ** (,481) -2,081 ** (,409) -2,053 ** (,393) 
         
Complexity level jC           
(coefficient α2)         
(1) <LS -9,299 ** (,504) -10,450 ** (,424) - 
(2) LS -8,380 ** (,481) -10,317 ** (,491) - 
(3) HS -6,763 ** (,469) -9,335 ** (,418) -7,263 ** (,370) 
(4) LT -4,365 ** (,447) -5,558 ** (,377) -3,918 ** (,346) 
(5) HT (ref.)         
         
Firm-size         
Unknown -,579 * (,256) -,430  (,283) -,794 ** (,255) 
Small -,759 ** (,161) -,450 * (,184) -,707 ** (,162) 
Medium -,289 * (,138) -,115  (,162) -,302 * (,140) 
Large (ref.)         
         
Occupation         
Technical -,722 ** (,189) ,013  (,161) ,320 * (,152) 
Clerical ,704 ** (,173) 1,055 ** (,178) ,421 ** (,153) 
Socio-cultural 1,103 ** (,292) 1,405 ** (,382) ,590 * (,300) 
Other (ref.)         
         
Sector         
Unknown ,107  (,355) ,193  (,399) -,280  (,353) 
Primary ,074  (,473) -,230  (,503) -,518  (,475) 
Industry ,404  (,212) -,071  (,234) -,409 * (,201) 
Construction ,419  (,289) -,062  (,315) -,293  (,285) 
Commerce ,302  (,223) ,068  (,247) -,362  (,215) 
Catering ,157  (,279) ,035  (,305) -,349  (,278) 
Transport and Commun.  ,067  (,272) ,121  (,310) -,500  (,272) 
Finance ,922 ** (,310) -,182  (,384) ,018  (,303) 
Professional Services ,671 ** (,238) ,111  (,275) ,240  (,233) 
Government -,261  (,335) -,303  (,381) -,495  (,333) 
Education ,202  (,225) ,899 ** (,277) ,295  (,220) 
Other Services ,245  (,309) ,361  (,356) ,067  (,303) 
Health Care (ref.)         
         
Unmeasured complexity ,248 ** (,061) ,216 ** (,067) ,383 ** (,060) 
         
Chi² (complexity levels)   944,8 ** 1566,2 ** 866,4 ** 
Chi² (unm. complexity) 16,3 ** 10,3 ** 40,8 ** 
Chi² (model) 1748,4 ** 2340,3 ** 1674,4 ** 
-2 Log Likelihood 3399,6 2704,2 3473,6 
Deg. of freedom 29 29 27 
N 2145 2091 2145 
Also included but not reported: dummies for part-time contract (1), temporary contract (1) and region of 
employment (4). *: significant at the 5% level, **: significant at the 1% level.  
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(H11) The probability of hiring an overeducated worker is higher in the financial and 
professional services sector. In the estimation based on the JA measure, jobs in the financial 
and professional services sector have the highest likelihood of being occupied by higher 
educated workers. However, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed when the analysis is based 
on RL or RM. The analysis of Battu and Sloane (2002), based on the required level to get the 
job, also didn’t confirm this proposition. Although not explicitly testing this hypothesis, based 
on a RM measure, Groot (1996) didn’t find evidence that overeducation is especially 
concentrated in the banking, finance, insurance and business services sector either. Contrary, 
van der Meer and Wielers (1996) based the test that confirmed their hypothesis on a JA 
measure.  
 
 
VIII. The validity of the overeducation measures 
 
In this section, we analyse the validity of the applied measures in further detail. The 
evaluation of the first two hypotheses are based on the previous analysis. For the last two 
hypotheses, we executed some additional estimations (cf. table 4). 
(H12) Part of the variation in the extent of overeducation results from a heterogeneity 
of requirements within measured complexity levels. Jobs that require more of the skills 
measured by the included unmeasured complexity factor more often rely on overeducated 
workers (cf. table 3). The effect is robust and highly significant for all of the three applied 
measurement methods. As argued in section III, this heterogeneity of skill requirements 
within measured complexity levels does not necessarily lead to an overestimation of the 
incidence of over- and undereducation. Furthermore, chi² statistics suggest that this 
unmeasured complexity only contributes to a very small part of explained variance compared 
to measured complexity levels. 
(H13) JA delivers the most consistent results. Only four out of eleven hypotheses 
((H1), (H2), (H8) and (H10)) are clearly confirmed by the empirical results for all of the 
measures we applied. Additionally, the results of the analysis based on RL are in line with 
(H7) and those based on RM with (H3) and (H6). However, all of the hypotheses are 
confirmed by the analysis based on JA. Hence, JA clearly delivers the most consistent results. 
Although the value of this test depends on the validity of the theoretical considerations, the 
small ability of the RM and RL measure compared to the JA measure to corroborate these 
hypotheses is remarkable. 
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Table 4: The validity of the overeducation measures (equation (3.3) and (3.4)): coefficients 
and standard errors (in parentheses)  
 Qualification inflation  
(equation (3.3), ordered logit) 
RM level > Complexity level (JA) 
(equation (3.4), binary logit) 
Threshold ( rθ )     
(1) <LS -8,214 ** (,431) - 
(2) LS -7,912 ** (,429) - 
(3) HS -5,918 ** (,419) - 
(4) LT -2,598 ** (,391) - 
     
Intercept (θ ) - -7,539 ** (,801) 
     
Complexity level jC      
(1) <LS -9,498 ** (,428) - 
(2) LS -7,896 ** (,389) - 
(3) HS -6,056 ** (,376) 6,681 ** (,607) 
(4) LT (ref. equation (4)) -3,730 ** (,348) - 
(5) HT (ref. equation (3))     
     
Firm-size     
Unknown -,420  (,268) -,121  (,912) 
Small -,490 ** (,155) -,318  (,470) 
Medium -,325 * (,133) -,357  (,407) 
Large (ref.)     
     
Occupation     
Technical -,568 ** (,180) -4,674 ** (,719) 
Clerical ,003  (,164) 4,003 ** (,521) 
Socio-cultural ,552  (,288) 5,655 ** (,789) 
Other (ref.)     
     
Sector     
Unknown -,585  (,367) -,406  (,937) 
Primary -2,086 ** (,810) - 
Industry ,094  (,209) 1,776 ** (,542) 
Construction ,371  (,276) ,201  (1,42) 
Commerce -,574 ** (,221) 1,440 * (,633) 
Catering -,576 * (,281) -1,777  (1,18) 
Transport and Communic. -,492  (,264) -,930  (,636) 
Finance ,804 ** (,300) ,428  (,882) 
Professional Services ,364  (,233) -,097  (,618) 
Government -,181  (,320) -,407  (,682) 
Education -,223  (,222) -,304  (,992) 
Other Services -,522  (,294) -,488  (,615) 
Health Care (ref.)     
     
Unmeasured complexity ,490 ** (,062) ,396  (,212) 
     
Chi² (complexity levels C) 1097,7 ** 372,7 ** 
Chi² (unmeasured complexity) 63,0 ** 3,6  
Chi² (model) 1991,8 ** 835,4 ** 
-2 Log Likelihood 3765,0 344,7 
Deg. of freedom 29 25 
N 2075 1048 
Also included but not reported: dummies for part-time contract (1), temporary contract (1) and region of 
employment (4). *: significant at the 5% level, **: significant at the 1% level.  
 
(H14) The functional level based on RL is biased by the selection behaviour of the employer. 
As expected, qualification inflation is especially concentrated in large firms and the finance 
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sector, while qualification deflation is more prevalent in technical occupations (cf. table 4, 
equation (3.3)). Similarly, lower complexity levels have also a lower minimal required level. 
The predictions for qualification inflation are thus similar to those for overeducation and give 
further support to (H8) – (H11). The reported minimal required level can thus serve as an 
imperfect measure of the reservation educational level11. These results explain why the 
hypothesis about the concentration of overeducation in occupations without bottleneck 
vacancies (H9) and the financial and professional services sector (H11) could not be 
confirmed when the analysis was based on the required level to get the job. It is also clear 
why the relation between overeducation and firm size (H10) was less strong in this case. 
Furthermore, this may explain why Battu and Sloane (2002) couldn’t find evidence for the 
credentials hypothesis of van der Meer and Wielers (1996) either. Again, we computed the 
estimated cumulative probabilities for each complexity level (cf. Appendix C). Qualification 
deflation is especially concentrated at the lower secondary job level. Employers may not 
specify any qualification requirement since almost every job seeker has at least a lower 
secondary qualification. Indeed, more than 90% of the vacancies at this level are even filled 
by school leavers with more than a lower secondary qualification (cf. supra). Another 
interesting finding from our analysis is that qualification inflation is higher in jobs with more 
unmeasured skill requirements. Thus, the measure based on RL partly corrects for the 
heterogeneity of skill requirements within complexity levels measured by JA. 
(H15) The functional level based on RM is biased by the extent of over- and 
undereducation within occupations. Parallel to this hypothesis, the probability that the 
functional level measured by RM exceeds the objective job level is higher in jobs for socio-
cultural and lower in jobs for technical professions (cf. table 4, equation (3.4)). Hence, the 
lack of evidence for the hypothesis that overeducation is less concentrated in technical 
professions (H9) when a realised matches measure is applied is not surprising. Furthermore, 
some sectors of employment such as education and health care largely coincide with certain 
occupations such as teachers and nurses. This fact may explain why also the sector part of the 
credentials hypothesis of van der Meer and Wielers (1996) was not confirmed when the 
analysis was based on a RM measure. Contrary to the RL level, the RM level does not correct 
for the heterogeneity of skills within the levels measured by JA. This is logical since both 
measures are based on the same classification (cf. supra). Additionally, it supports the 
supposition of (H13) that the JA levels are unbiased. Otherwise, we would expect that the 
modal educational level partly corrects for the bias caused by technological change. 
                                                          
11 This is also illustrated by the following test: Regressing educational levels on RL levels (cf. model 3.2) 
delivers an adj. R² of 0,72. Further inclusion of the other explanatory variables raises this statistic to only 0,74. 
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IX. Conclusions 
 
Based on three measures, we analysed the determinants of overeducation in the first job after 
leaving school within a search theoretical framework. This enabled us to shed more light on 
the validity of the measures and to identify the real factors that determine overeducation. The 
following conclusions can be made: 
(1) The outcome of the analysis of the determinants of overeducation depends to a large 
extent on the way over- and undereducation is measured. Few results are robust over the three 
measures: while all of the eleven formulated hypotheses are confirmed in the case of job 
analysis, only five hypotheses are confirmed when overeducation is measured by the required 
level to get the job and six when measurement is based on realised matches. Hence, job 
analysis clearly delivers most consistent results (H13). 
(2) The required level to get the job is biased by the selection behaviour of the employer 
(H14), while the functional level based on realised matches is biased by the extent of over- 
and undereducation within occupations (H15). This explains to a large extent why the 
estimated determinants of overeducation measured by these two measures are not always in 
line with expectations based on theoretical considerations.  
(3) The following hypotheses are confirmed, irrespective of the applied measure: (H1) 
higher qualified individuals occupy higher complexity jobs, (H2) the likelihood of being 
overeducated is lower among school leavers with better study results, (H8) higher complexity 
jobs more often rely on higher qualified workers and (H10) the probability of hiring an 
overeducated worker is higher in large organizations.  
(4) Based on the job analysis measure, we find in addition evidence for the other 
hypotheses: the likelihood of being overeducated is lower among (H3) individuals from 
higher quality institutions, (H4) men, (H5) whites, (H6) individuals with higher educated 
parents and (H7) search intensive individuals, the likelihood of hiring an overeducated worker 
is higher in (H9) occupations without bottleneck vacancies and (H11) the financial and 
professional services sector. 
(5) The analysis indicates that, irrespective of the applied measurement procedure, part of 
the variation in the extent of over- and undereducation is explained by a heterogeneity of skill 
requirements within measured complexity levels. However, the explained variance of this 
heterogeneity is rather small. 
This paper clearly shows both formally and empirically that the choice of the measure for 
overeducation is crucial for the outcome of the analysis. Results in the empirical literature on 
overeducation often say more about the way overeducation is measured than about 
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overeducation itself. Hence, measuring overeducation in several ways and a good knowledge 
of the pros and cons of these measures is needed to interpret the empirical results and draw 
correct conclusions.  
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
 
Educational Levels (E) 
(1) <LS = Less than lower secondary education.  
(2) LS = Lower secondary education. This is defined as a second degree secondary and 
corresponds to 4 years of secondary education. 
(3) HS = Higher secondary education. This is defined as a third degree secondary and 
corresponds to 6 years of secondary education. 
(4) LT = Lower tertiary education. This is defined as short higher education and corresponds 
to higher education of three years. 
(5) HS = Higher tertiary education. This is defined as higher education at university or 
universitary level and corresponds to higher education of minimally four years.  
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The educational levels are recoded into dummy variables with HS as reference. 
Complexity Levels (C) 
The job levels correspond to the same categories as the educational levels and are coded in the 
same way. The computation is based on 3 measurement methods: 
JA = Job Analysis: Based on the Standard Occupation Classification of 1992 of the Dutch 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 
RL = Required level to get the job: Based on the question: ‘To get your job, what educational 
level were you required to have?’.  
RM = Realised Matches. Based on the model value of attained education within each two-
digit level occupation of the CBS-classification. 
Worker characteristics (X) 
Woman = Dummy coded 1 if woman. 
Non-white = Dummy coded 1 if individual has a grandmother at the mothers side who has a 
birth or nationality from outside Europe and North-America. 
HT father = Dummy coded 1 if individual has a father with a higher tertiary qualification. 
Search behaviour = Two dummies for individuals which started their search activity 
respectively more than one month and less than one month before leaving school.  
Study results = Two dummies for the following study results in the last year of tertiary 
education: distinction and great distinction.  
Part-time = dummy for HS school leavers who obtained their HS degree in part-time 
education.  
Extra part-time = dummy for HS school leavers who obtained after their full-time HS degree 
an extra part-time degree.  
Seventh year = dummy for HS school leavers who obtained after their full-time HS degree a 
qualification for an additional seventh year.  
Not finished TE = dummy for HS school leavers who finished at least one year in tertiary 
education, without obtaining the final degree.  
University = dummy for HT school leavers who obtained their degree at university. 
Regional Residence = 5 categories of regional residence recoded into 4 dummies. The 
categories correspond to 5 Flemish provinces. 
Job characteristics (Y) 
Firm Size = Four categories recoded into 3 dummies. Categories based on number of workers 
in the firm. 
Occupations = 3 dummies for the following occupations: technical professions (CBS6), 
clerical professions (CBS11) and socio-cultural professions (CBS15-16). 
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Sector = 13 categories recoded into 12 dummies. Categories based on NACE-classification. 
Region of Employment = 5 categories recoded into 4 dummies. The categories correspond to 
the 5 Flemish provinces (Brussels is included in the category Vlaams-Brabant). 
Type of contract = 1 dummy coded 1 if part-time contract, 1 dummy for temporary contract. 
Unmeasured Complexity = Variable created by factor and regression analysis from five skills 
needed to do the job (cf. Appendix B). The skills are derived from the following 
question: ’Do you totally agree, rather agree, rather disagree or totally disagree, in my 
job you need the skills to …’: 
(1) supervise other people (leadership skills), 
(2) charge a lot of responsibilities (responsibility skills), 
(3) read and write fluently (reading and writing skills), 
(4) calculate and deal with numbers (mathematical skills), 
(5) collaborate with other people (social skills). 
 
 
Appendix B: Factor and regression analysis of unmeasured job complexity 
 
Table B1: Principal component analysis: factor loadings (Cronbach’s α = ,724) 
Responsibility skills ,697 
Leadership skills ,571 
Reading and writing skills ,761 
Mathematical skills ,666 
Social skills ,752 
 
Table B2: OLS regression of complexity factor on measured job levels: coefficients and 
standard errors (in parentheses) 
Job level measurement JA RL RM 
Complexity level C         
(1) <LS -0,843  (,086) -0,540  (,070) - 
(2) LS -0,273  (,097) -0,178  (,114) - 
(3) HS 0,142  (,092) 0,048  (,075) -0,368  (,087) 
(4) LT 0,735  (,092) 0,632  (,074) 0,626  (,090) 
(5) HT 0,660  (,095) 0,639  (,063) 0,634  (,084) 
         
Adjusted R² 0,279 0,251 0,231 
N 2145 2091 2145 
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Appendix C: Estimated probabilities 
 
Table C1: Estimated probabilities of finding a job with minimally level k by educational level 
Educational level E complexity level 
k (1) <LS (2) LS (3) HS (4) LT (5) HT 
(1) <LS 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
(2) LS 55,9% 58,5% 78,7% 99,2% 99,9% 
(3) HS 14,5% 15,9% 33,1% 94,1% 99,1% 
(4) LT 1,3% 1,5% 3,7% 55,5% 90,1% 
JA 
(5) HT 0,0% 0,1% 0,1% 4,1% 23,9% 
(1) <LS 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
(2) LS 12,7% 14,0% 42,1% 97,3% 100,0% 
(3) HS 10,1% 11,2% 36,1% 96,6% 100,0% 
(4) LT 1,3% 1,5% 6,4% 77,4% 99,6% 
RL 
(5) HT 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 4,5% 78,1% 
(3) HS  100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
(4) LT  2,2% 8,5% 80,5% 98,1% RM 
(5) HT  0,0% 0,1% 3,8% 33,2% 
 
Table C2: Estim. probabilities of hiring a worker with minimally level l by complexity level 
Complexity level C Educational 
level l (1) <LS (2) LS (3) HS (4) LT (5) HT 
 JA 
(1) <LS 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
(2) LS 92,0% 96,6% 99,3% 99,9% 100,0% 
(3) HS 77,5% 89,6% 97,8% 99,8% 100,0% 
(4) LT 4,1% 9,7% 35,2% 85,6% 99,8% 
(5) HT 0,1% 0,4% 1,8% 16,6% 94,0% 
 RL 
(1) <LS 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
(2) LS 95,4% 95,9% 98,4% 100,0% 100,0% 
(3) HS 86,3% 87,8% 95,0% 99,9% 100,0% 
(4) LT 5,7% 6,5% 15,6% 89,0% 100,0% 
(5) HT 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 5,1% 93,3% 
 RM 
(1) <LS   100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
(2) LS   96,2% 99,9% 100,0% 
(3) HS   88,8% 99,6% 100,0% 
(4) LT   10,3% 76,5% 99,4% 
(5) HT   0,5% 11,7% 86,9% 
 
Table C3: Estim. probabilities of minimally reservation educational level r by job level C 
Complexity level C (JA) Reservation ed. 
level r (RL) (1) <LS (2) LS (3) HS (4) LT (5) HT 
(1) <LS 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
(2) LS 12,0% 40,5% 81,1% 97,8% 99,9% 
(3) HS 9,2% 33,4% 76,0% 97,0% 99,9% 
(4) LT 1,4% 6,4% 30,1% 81,5% 99,5% 
(5) HT 0,0% 0,2% 1,5% 13,7% 86,9% 
 
 
 
   FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
   HOVENIERSBERG 24 
   9000 GENT Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61  
 Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92  
 
 
 WORKING PAPER SERIES              7 
 
 
01/119 N. GOBBIN, B. VAN AARLE, Fiscal Adjustments and Their Effects during the Transition to the EMU, October 
2001, 28 p. (published in Public Choice, 2001). 
 
01/120 A. DE VOS, D. BUYENS, R. SCHALK, Antecedents of the Psychological Contract: The Impact of Work Values and 
Exchange Orientation on Organizational Newcomers’ Psychological Contracts, November 2001, 41 p. 
 
01/121 A. VAN LANDSCHOOT, Sovereign Credit Spreads and the Composition of the Government Budget, November 
2001, 29 p. (forthcoming in Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 2004). 
 
01/122 K. SCHOORS, The fate of Russia’s former state banks: Chronicle of a restructuring postponed and a crisis foretold, 
November 2001, 54 p.  (published in Europe-Asia Studies, 2003) 
 
01/123 J. ALBRECHT, D. FRANÇOIS, K. SCHOORS, A Shapley Decomposition of Carbon Emissions without Residuals, 
December 2001, 21 p.  (published in Energy Policy, 2002). 
 
01/124 T. DE LANGHE, H. OOGHE, Are Acquisitions Worthwhile? An Empirical Study of the Post-Acquisition Performance 
of Privately Held Belgian Companies Involved in Take-overs,  December 2001, 29 p. 
 
01/125 L. POZZI, Government debt, imperfect information and fiscal policy effects on private consumption. Evidence for 2 
high debt countries,  December 2001, 34 p. 
 
02/126 G. RAYP, W. MEEUSEN, Social Protection Competition in the EMU, January 2002, 20 p.  
 
02/127 S. DE MAN, P. GEMMEL, P. VLERICK, P. VAN RIJK, R. DIERCKX, Patients’ and personnel’s perceptions of 
service quality and patient satisfaction in nuclear medicine, January 2002, 21 p. 
 
02/128 T. VERBEKE, M. DE CLERCQ, Environmental Quality and Economic Growth, January 2002, 48 p.  
 
02/129 T. VERBEKE, M. DE CLERCQ, Environmental policy, policy uncertainty and relocation decisions, January 2002, 33 p.  
 
02/130 W. BRUGGEMAN, V. DECOENE, An Empirical Study of the Influence of Balanced Scorecard-Based Variable 
Remuneration on the Performance Motivation of Operating Managers, January 2002, 19 p.  
 
02/131 B. CLARYSSE, N. MORAY, A. HEIRMAN, Transferring Technology by Spinning off Ventures: Towards an 
empirically based understanding of the spin off process, January 2002, 32 p.  
 
02/132 H. OOGHE, S. BALCAEN, Are Failure Prediction Models Transferable From One Country to Another? An Empirical 
Study Using Belgian Financial Statements, February 2002, 42 p.  
 
02/133 M. VANHOUCKE, E. DEMEULEMEESTER, W. HERROELEN, Discrete Time/Cost Trade-offs in Project scheduling 
with Time-Switch Constraints? February 2002, 23 p. (published in Journal of the Operational Research Society, 
2002) 
 
02/134 C. MAYER, K. SCHOORS, Y. YAFEH, Sources of Funds and Investment Activities of Venture Capital Funds: 
Evidence from Germany, Israel, Japan and the UK?, February 2002, 31 p. (forthcoming in Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 2004) 
 
02/135 K. DEWETTINCK, D. BUYENS, Employment implications of downsizing strategies and reorientation practices: an 
empirical exploration, February 2002, 22 p.  
 
02/136 M. DELOOF, M. DE MAESENEIRE, K. INGHELBRECHT, The Valuation of IPOs by Investment Banks and the 
Stock Market: Empirical Evidence, February 2002, 24 p.  
 
02/137 P. EVERAERT, W. BRUGGEMAN, Cost Targets and Time Pressure during New Product Development, March 
2002, 21 p. (published in International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 2002). 
 
02/138 D. O’NEILL, O. SWEETMAN, D. VAN DE GAER, The impact of cognitive skills on the distribution of the black-
white wage gap, March 2002, 14 p.  
 
 
 
   FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
   HOVENIERSBERG 24 
   9000 GENT Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61  
 Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92  
 
 
 WORKING PAPER SERIES              8 
 
02/139   W. DE MAESENEIRE, S. MANIGART, Initial returns: underpricing or overvaluation? Evidence from Easdaq and 
EuroNM, March 2002, 36 p. 
 
02/140  K. SCHOORS, Should the Central and Eastern European accession countries adopt the EURO before or after 
accession? March 2002, 29p. (published in Economics of Planning, 2002). 
 
02/141   D. VERHAEST, E. OMEY, Overeducation in the Flemish Youth Labour Market, March 2002, 39p. 
 
02/142  L. CUYVERS, M. DUMONT, G. RAYP, K. STEVENS, Wage and Employment Effects in the EU of International 
Trade with the Emerging Economies, April 2002, 24 p. (published in Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 2003). 
 
02/143 M. GEUENS, P. DE PELSMACKER, The Role of Humor in the Persuasion of Individuals Varying in Need for 
Cognition, April 2002, 19 p. (published in Advances in Consumer Research, 2002). 
 
02/144 M. VANHOUCKE, E. DEMEULEMEESTER, W. HERROELEN, Net Present Value Maximization of Projects with 
Progress Payments, April 2002, 23 p. (published in European Journal of Operational Research, 2003) 
 
02/145   E. SCHOKKAERT, D. VAN DE GAER, F. VANDENBROUCKE, Responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism and optimal 
linear income taxation, April 2002, 37p. (revised version, co-authored by R. Luttens, forthcoming in Mathematical 
Social Sciences, 2004). 
 
02/146 J. ANNAERT, J. CROMBEZ, B. SPINEL, F. VAN HOLLE, Value and size effect: Now you see it, now you don’t,        
May 2002, 31 p. 
 
02/147 N. HOUTHOOFD, A. HEENE, The quest for strategic groups: Overview, and suggestions for future research, July 
2002, 22 p. 
 
02/148 G. PEERSMAN, The transmission of monetary policy in the Euro area: Are the effects different across countries?,  
July 2002, 35 p. 
 
02/149 G. PEERSMAN, F. SMETS, The industry effects of monetary policy in the Euro area, July 2002, 30 p. 
 
02/150 J. BOUCKAERT, G. DHAENE, Inter-Ethnic Trust and Reciprocity: Results of an Experiment with Small Business  
Entrepreneurs, July 2002, 27 p. (forthcoming in European Journal of Political Economy, 2004)  
 
02/151 S. GARRÉ, I. DE BEELDE, Y. LEVANT, The impact of accounting differences between France and Belgium, 
August 2002, 28 p. (published in French in Comptabilité - Controle - Audit, 2002)  
 
02/152   R. VANDER VENNET, Cross-border mergers in European banking and bank efficiency, September 2002, 42 p. 
 
02/153  K. SCHOORS, Financial regulation in Central Europe: the role of reserve requirements and capital rules,  
September 2002, 22 p. 
 
02/154 B. BAESENS, G. VERSTRAETEN, D. VAN DEN POEL, M. EGMONT-PETERSEN, P. VAN KENHOVE, J. 
VANTHIENEN, Bayesian Network Classifiers for Identifying the Slope of the Customer Lifecycle of Long-Life 
Customers, October 2002, 27 p.  (forthcoming in European Journal of Operational Research, 2003). 
 
02/155 L. POZZI, F. HEYLEN, M. DOSSCHE, Government debt and the excess sensitivity of private consumption to 
current income: an empirical analysis for OECD countries, October 2002, 19 p. (forthcoming in Economic Inquiry, 
2004) 
02/156 D. O’NEILL, O. SWEETMAN, D. VAN DE GAER, Consequences of Specification Error for Distributional Analysis 
With an Application to Intergenerational Mobility, November 2002, 35 p.  
 
02/157 K. SCHOORS, B. VAN DER TOL, Foreign direct investment spillovers within and between sectors: Evidence from 
Hungarian data, November 2002, 29 p.  
 
02/158 L. CUYVERS, M. DUMONT, G. RAYP, K. STEVENS, Home Employment Effects of EU Firms' Activities in Central 
and Eastern European Countries, November 2002, 25 p.  
 
02/159 M. VANHOUCKE, Optimal due date assignment in project scheduling, December 2002, 18 p. 
 
 
 
 
   FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
   HOVENIERSBERG 24 
   9000 GENT Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61  
 Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92  
 
 
 WORKING PAPER SERIES              9 
 
 
02/160 J. ANNAERT, M.J.K. DE CEUSTER, W. VANHYFTE, The Value of Asset Allocation Advice. Evidence from the 
Economist’s Quarterly Portfolio Poll, December 2002, 35p. (revised version forthcoming in Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 2004) 
 
02/161 M. GEUENS, P. DE PELSMACKER, Developing a Short Affect Intensity Scale, December 2002, 20 p. (published in 
Psychological Reports, 2002).  
 
02/162 P. DE PELSMACKER, M. GEUENS, P. ANCKAERT, Media context and advertising effectiveness: The role of 
context appreciation and context-ad similarity, December 2002, 23 p.  (published in Journal of Advertising, 2002). 
 
03/163 M. GEUENS, D. VANTOMME, G. GOESSAERT, B. WEIJTERS, Assessing the impact of offline URL advertising,  
January 2003, 20 p.   
 
03/164 D. VAN DEN POEL, B. LARIVIÈRE, Customer Attrition Analysis For Financial Services Using Proportional Hazard 
Models,  January 2003, 39 p.  (forthcoming in European Journal of Operational Research, 2003) 
 
03/165 P. DE PELSMACKER, L. DRIESEN, G. RAYP, Are fair trade labels good business ? Ethics and coffee buying 
intentions, January 2003, 20 p. 
 
03/166 D. VANDAELE, P. GEMMEL, Service Level Agreements – Een literatuuroverzicht,  Januari 2003, 31 p. (published 
in Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management, 2003). 
 
03/167   P. VAN KENHOVE, K. DE WULF AND S. STEENHAUT, The relationship between consumers’ unethical behavior 
and customer loyalty in a retail environment, February 2003, 27 p. (published in Journal of Business Ethics, 2003). 
03/168   P. VAN KENHOVE, K. DE WULF, D. VAN DEN POEL, Does attitudinal commitment to stores always lead to 
behavioural loyalty? The moderating effect of age, February 2003, 20 p. 
03/169   E. VERHOFSTADT, E. OMEY, The impact of education on job satisfaction in the first job, March 2003, 16 p. 
03/170   S. DOBBELAERE, Ownership, Firm Size and Rent Sharing in a Transition Country, March 2003, 26 p. 
(forthcoming in Labour Economics, 2004) 
 
03/171   S. DOBBELAERE, Joint Estimation of Price-Cost Margins and Union Bargaining Power for Belgian Manufacturing, 
March 2003, 29 p. 
 
03/172   M. DUMONT, G. RAYP, P. WILLEMÉ, O. THAS,  Correcting Standard Errors in Two-Stage Estimation Procedures 
with Generated Regressands, April 2003, 12 p. 
 
03/173 L. POZZI, Imperfect information and the excess sensitivity of private consumption to government expenditures, 
April 2003, 25 p. 
 
03/174 F. HEYLEN, A. SCHOLLAERT, G. EVERAERT, L. POZZI, Inflation and human capital formation: theory and panel 
data evidence, April 2003, 24 p. 
 
03/175 N.A. DENTCHEV, A. HEENE, Reputation management: Sending the right signal to the right stakeholder, April 
2003, 26 p. 
 
03/176 A. WILLEM, M. BUELENS, Making competencies cross business unit boundaries: the interplay between inter-unit 
coordination, trust and knowledge transferability, April 2003, 37 p. 
 
03/177 K. SCHOORS, K. SONIN, Passive creditors, May 2003, 33 p. 
 
03/178 W. BUCKINX, D. VAN DEN POEL, Customer Base Analysis: Partial Defection of Behaviorally-Loyal Clients in a 
Non-Contractual FMCG Retail Setting, May 2003, 26 p. (forthcoming in European Journal of Operational Research) 
 
03/179 H. OOGHE, T. DE LANGHE, J. CAMERLYNCK, Profile of multiple versus single acquirers and their targets : a 
research note, June 2003, 15 p. 
 
 
   FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
   HOVENIERSBERG 24 
   9000 GENT Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61  
 Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92  
 
 
 WORKING PAPER SERIES             10 
 
 
03/180 M. NEYT, J. ALBRECHT, B. CLARYSSE, V. COCQUYT, The Cost-Effectiveness of Herceptin® in a Standard Cost 
Model for Breast-Cancer Treatment in a Belgian University Hospital, June 2003, 20 p. 
 
03/181 M. VANHOUCKE, New computational results for the discrete time/cost trade-off problem with time-switch 
constraints, June 2003, 24 p. 
 
03/182 C. SCHLUTER, D. VAN DE GAER, Mobility as distributional difference, June 2003, 22 p. 
 
03/183 B. MERLEVEDE, Reform Reversals and Output Growth in Transition Economies,  June 2003, 35 p. (published in 
Economics of Transition, 2003) 
 
03/184 G. POELS, Functional Size Measurement of Multi-Layer Object-Oriented Conceptual Models, June 2003, 13 p. 
(published as ‘Object-oriented information systems’ in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2003) 
 
03/185 A. VEREECKE, M. STEVENS, E. PANDELAERE, D. DESCHOOLMEESTER, A classification of programmes and 
its managerial impact, June 2003, 11 p. (forthcoming in International Journal of Operations and Production 
Management, 2003) 
 
03/186 S. STEENHAUT, P. VANKENHOVE, Consumers’ Reactions to “Receiving Too Much Change at the Checkout”, 
July 2003, 28 p. 
 
03/187 H. OOGHE, N. WAEYAERT, Oorzaken van faling en falingspaden: Literatuuroverzicht en conceptueel verklarings-
model, July 2003, 35 p. 
 
03/188 S. SCHILLER, I. DE BEELDE, Disclosure of improvement activities related to tangible assets, August 2003, 21 p. 
 
03/189 L. BAELE, Volatility Spillover Effects in European Equity Markets, August 2003, 73 p. 
 
03/190 A. SCHOLLAERT, D. VAN DE GAER, Trust, Primary Commodity Dependence and Segregation, August 2003, 18 p 
 
03/191 D. VAN DEN POEL, Predicting Mail-Order Repeat Buying: Which Variables Matter?, August 2003, 25 p. 
(published in Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management, 2003) 
 
03/192 T. VERBEKE, M. DE CLERCQ, The income-environment relationship: Does a logit model offer an alternative 
empirical strategy?, September 2003, 32 p. 
 
03/193 S. HERMANNS, H. OOGHE, E. VAN LAERE, C. VAN WYMEERSCH, Het type controleverslag: resultaten van een 
empirisch onderzoek in België, September 2003, 18 p. 
 
03/194 A. DE VOS, D. BUYENS, R. SCHALK, Psychological Contract Development during Organizational Socialization: 
Adaptation to Reality and the Role of Reciprocity, September 2003, 42 p. 
 
03/195 W. BUCKINX, D. VAN DEN POEL, Predicting Online Purchasing Behavior,  September 2003, 43 p. 
 
03/196 N.A. DENTCHEV, A. HEENE, Toward stakeholder responsibility and stakeholder motivation: Systemic and holistic 
perspectives on corporate sustainability, September 2003, 37 p. 
 
03/197 D. HEYMAN, M. DELOOF, H. OOGHE, The Debt-Maturity Structure of Small Firms in a Creditor-Oriented 
Environment, September 2003, 22 p. 
 
03/198 A. HEIRMAN, B. CLARYSSE, V. VAN DEN HAUTE, How and Why Do Firms Differ at Start-Up? A Resource-
Based Configurational Perspective, September 2003, 43 p. 
 
03/199 M. GENERO, G. POELS, M. PIATTINI, Defining and Validating Metrics for Assessing the Maintainability of Entity-
Relationship Diagrams, October 2003, 61 p. 
 
 
 
 
   FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
   HOVENIERSBERG 24 
   9000 GENT Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61  
 Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92  
 
 
 WORKING PAPER SERIES             11 
 
 
03/200 V. DECOENE, W. BRUGGEMAN, Strategic alignment of manufacturing processes in a Balanced Scorecard-based 
compensation plan: a theory illustration case, October 2003, 22 p. 
 
03/201 W. BUCKINX, E. MOONS, D. VAN DEN POEL, G. WETS, Customer-Adapted Coupon Targeting Using Feature 
Selection, November 2003, 31 p. (forthcoming in Expert Systems with Applications). 
 
03/202 D. VAN DEN POEL, J. DE SCHAMPHELAERE, G. WETS, Direct and Indirect Effects of Retail Promotions, 
November 2003, 21 p. (forthcoming in Expert Systems with Applications). 
 
03/203 S. CLAEYS, R. VANDER VENNET, Determinants of bank interest margins in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Convergence to the West?, November 2003, 28 p.  
 
03/204 M. BRENGMAN, M. GEUENS, The four dimensional impact of color on shoppers’ emotions, December 2003, 15 p. 
(forthcoming in Advances in Consumer Research, 2004) 
 
03/205 M. BRENGMAN, M. GEUENS, B. WEIJTERS, S.C. SMITH, W.R. SWINYARD, Segmenting Internet shoppers 
based on their web-usage-related lifestyle: a cross-cultural validation, December 2003, 15 p. (forthcoming in 
Journal of Business Research, 2004) 
 
03/206 M. GEUENS, D. VANTOMME, M. BRENGMAN, Developing a typology of airport shoppers, December 2003, 13 p. 
(forthcoming in Tourism Management, 2004)  
 
03/207 J. CHRISTIAENS, C. VANHEE, Capital Assets in Governmental Accounting Reforms, December 2003, 25 p.  
 
03/208 T. VERBEKE, M. DE CLERCQ, Environmental policy uncertainty, policy coordination and relocation decisions, 
December 2003, 32 p.  
 
03/209 A. DE VOS, D. BUYENS, R. SCHALK, Making Sense of a New Employment Relationship: Psychological Contract-
Related Information Seeking and the Role of Work Values and Locus of Control, December 2003, 32 p.  
 
03/210 K. DEWETTINCK, J. SINGH, D. BUYENS, Psychological Empowerment in the Workplace: Reviewing the 
Empowerment Effects on Critical Work Outcomes, December 2003, 24 p.  
 
03/211 M. DAKHLI, D. DE CLERCQ, Human Capital, Social Capital and Innovation: A Multi-Country Study, November 
2003, 32 p.  (forthcoming in Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 2004). 
 
03/212 D. DE CLERCQ, H.J. SAPIENZA, H. CRIJNS,  The Internationalization of Small and Medium-Sized Firms: The 
Role of Organizational Learning Effort and Entrepreneurial Orientation, November 2003, 22 p (forthcoming in Small 
Business Economics, 2004).  
 
03/213 A. PRINZIE, D. VAN DEN POEL, Investigating Purchasing Patterns for Financial Services using Markov, MTD and 
MTDg Models, December 2003, 40 p.  
 
03/214 J.-J. JONKER, N. PIERSMA, D. VAN DEN POEL, Joint Optimization of Customer Segmentation and Marketing 
Policy to Maximize Long-Term Profitability, December 2003, 20 p.  
 
